Abstract. ECHO-256 is a second-round candidate of the SHA-3 competition. It is an AESbased hash function that has attracted a lot of interest and analysis. Up to now, the best known attacks were a distinguisher on the full internal permutation and a collision on four rounds of its compression function. The latter was the best known analysis on the compression function as well as the one on the largest number of rounds so far. In this paper, we extend the compression function results to get a distinguisher on 7 out of 8 rounds using rebound techniques. We also present the rst 5-round collision attack on the ECHO-256 hash function.
Introduction
ECHO-256 [1] is the 256-bit version of one of the second-round candidates of the SHA-3 competition. It is an AES-based hash function that has been the subject of many studies. Currently, the best known analysis of are a distinguisher on the full 8-round internal permutation proposed in [13] and improved in [10] . Furthermore, a 4-round collision attack of the compression function has been presented in [4] . A previous analysis due to Schläer in [14] has been shown to be incorrect in [4] , but it introduced an alternative description of the ECHO round-function, which has then been reused in several analyses, including this paper. The best results of this paper are a collision attack on the hash function reduced to 5 rounds and a distinguisher of the compression function on 7 rounds. Additionally, we cover two more attacks in the Appendix. The complexities of previous results and our proposed attacks are reported in Table 1 . Apart from the improved attacks on ECHO-256, this paper also covers a number of new techniques. The merging process of multiple inbound phases has been improved to nd solutions also for the hash function, where much less freedom is available in the chaining input. For the hash function collision attack on 5 rounds, we use subspace dierences which collide with a high probability at the output of the hash function. Additionally, we use multiple phases also in the outbound part to reduce the overall complexity of the attacks. For the 7 round compression function distinguisher, we use the new techniques and algorithms introduced in [10, 11] .
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 256-bit version of the ECHO hash function and detail an alternative view that has already been used in several analysis [4, 14] . In particular, we emphasize the SuperMixColumns and SuperSBox transformations that ease the analysis. In Section 3, we provide a collision attack on this hash function reduced to 5 rounds and a distinguisher of the 7-round compression function in Section 4.
2
ECHO-256 description
ECHO is an iterated hash function and the compression function of ECHO updates an internal state described by a 16 × 16 matrix of GF 2 8 elements, which can also be viewed as a At the end of the permutation, the BigFinal operation adds the current state to the initial one (feed-forward) and, in the case of ECHO-256, adds its four columns together to produce the new chaining value. In this paper, we only focus on and refer to the original publication [1] for more details on both and ECHO-512 versions. Note that the keys used in the two AES rounds are an internal counter and the salt, respectively: they are mainly introduced to break the existing symmetries of the AES unkeyed permutation [6] . Since we are not using any property relying on symmetry and adding constants does not change dierences, we omit these steps in the following.
Two versions of the hash function ECHO have been submitted to the SHA-3 contest: ECHO-256 and ECHO-512, which share the same state size and round function, but inject messages of size 1536 or 1024 bits respectively in the compression function. Note that the message is padded by adding a single 1 followed by zeros to ll up the last message block. The last 18 bytes of the last message block always contain the 2-byte hash output size, followed by the 16-byte message length. Focusing on and denoting f its compression function, H i the i-th output chaining value,
i the i-th message block composed of three chunks of 512 bits each M j i and S = [C 0 C 1 C 2 C 3 ] the four 512-bit ECHO-columns constituting state S, we have (H 0 = IV ):
AES. We recall that one round, among the ten ones, of the AES-128 permutation is the succession of four transformations: SubBytes (SB), ShiftRows (SR), MixColumns (MC) and AddRoundKey (AK). We refer to the original publication [15] for further details.
Notations. We consider each state in the ECHO internal permutation, namely after each elementary transformations. We start with S 0 , where the IV and the message are combined and end the rst round after eight transformations in S 8 . To refer to the AES-state at row i and column j of a particular ECHO-state S n , we use the notation S n [i, j]. Additionally, we introduce column-slice to refer to a thin column of size 16 × 1 of the ECHO state. The process of merging two lists
In the event that the merging should be done under some relation t, we use the operator |t| , where |t| represents the size of the constraint to be veried in bits. Finally, in an AES-state, we consider four diagonals (from 0 to 3): diagonal j ∈ [0, 3] will be the four elements (i, i + j (mod 4)), with i ∈ [0, 3].
Alternative description
For an easier description of some of the following attacks, we use an equivalent description of one round of the ECHO permutation. First, we swap the BigShiftRows transformation with the MixColumns transformation of the second AES round. Second, we swap SubBytes with ShiftRows of the rst AES round. Swapping these operations does not change the computational result of ECHO and similar alternative descriptions have already been used in the analysis of AES. Hence, one round of ECHO results in the two transformations SuperSBox (SB-MC-SB) and SuperMixColumns (MC-BMC), which are separated just by byte-shuing operation. The SuperSBox has rst been analyzed by Daemen and Rijmen in [2] to study two rounds of AES and has been independently used by Lamberger et al. in [5] and Gilbert and Peyrin in [12] to analyze AES-based hash functions. The SuperMixColumns has been rst introduced by Schläer in [14] and reused in [4] . We refer to those articles for further details as well. In this section, we use a sparse truncated dierential path and the properties of SuperMixColumns to get a collision attack on 5 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function. The resulting complexity is 2 112 with memory requirements of 2 85.3 . We rst describe the truncated dierential path (a truncated dierential path only considers whether a byte of the state is active or not) and show how to nd conforming input pairs. Due to the sparse truncated dierential path, we are able to apply a rebound attack with multiple inbound phases to ECHO. Since at most one fourth of each ECHO state is active, we have enough freedom for two inbound phases and are also able to fully control the chaining input of the hash function.
The Truncated Dierential Path
In the attack, we use two message blocks where the rst block does not contain dierences. For the second message block, we use the truncated dierential path given in Figure 2 . We use colors (red, yellow, green, blue, cyan) to describe dierent phases of the attack and to denote their resulting solutions. Active bytes are denoted by black color, and active AES states contain at least one active byte. Hence, the sequence of active AES states for each round of ECHO is as follows:
Note that in this path, we keep the number of active bytes low, except for the beginning and end. Therefore, we have enough freedom to nd many solutions. We do not allow dierences in the chaining input (blue) and in the padding (cyan). The last 16 bytes of the padding contain the message length and the two bytes above contain size of the hash function output. Note that the AES states containing the chaining values (blue) and padding (cyan) do not get mixed with other AES states until the rst BigMixColumns transformation. Since the lower half of the state (row 2 and 3) is truncated to compute the nal hash value, we force all dierences to be in the lower half of the message: the feed-forward will then preserve that property.
Colliding Subspace Dierences
In the following, we show that the resulting output dierences after 5 rounds lie in a vector space of reduced dimension. This can be used to construct a distinguisher for 5 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function. However, due to the low dimension of the output vector space, we can even extend this subspace distinguisher to get a collision attack on 5 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function.
First, we need to determine the dimension of the vector space at the output of the hash function. In general, the dimension of the output vector space is dened by the number of active bytes prior to the linear transformations in the last round (16 active bytes after the last SubBytes), combined with the number of active bytes at the input due to the feedforward (0 active bytes in our case). This would results in a vector space dimension of (16+0)×8 = 128. However, a weakness in the combined transformations SuperMixColumns, BigFinal and the output truncation reduces the vector space to a dimension of 64 at the output of the hash function for the truncated dierential path in Figure 2 .
We can move the BigFinal function prior to SuperMixColumns, since BigFinal is a linear transformation and the same linear transformation M SMC is applied to all columns in SuperMixColumns. Then, we get 4 active bytes at the same position in each AES state of the 4 resulting column-slices. To each active column-slice C 16 , we rst apply the SuperMixColumns multiplication with M SMC and then, a matrix multiplication using M trunc = [I 8 | 0 8 ] which truncates the lower 8 rows. Since only 4 bytes are active in C 16 , these transformations can be combined into a transformation using a reduced 4 × 8 matrix M comb applied to the reduced input C 4 , which contains only the 4 active bytes of C 16 :
The multiplication with zero dierences of Analyzing the resulting matrix M comb for all four active column-slices shows that in each case, the rank of M comb is two, and not four. This reduces the dimension of the vector space in each active column-slice from 32 to 16. Since we have four active columns, the total dimension of the vector space at the output of the hash function is 64. Furthermore, column i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} of the output hash value depends only on columns 4i of state S 38 . It follows that the output dierence in the rst column i = 0 of the output hash value depends only on the four active dierences in columns 0, 4, 8 and 12 of state S 38 , which we denote by a, b, c and d. To get a collision in the rst column of the hash function output, we get the following linear system of equations:
Since we cannot control the dierences a, b, c and d in the following attack, we need to nd a solution for this system of equations by brute-force. However, the brute-force complexity is less than expected due to the reduced rank of the given matrix. Since the rank is two, 2 16 solutions exist and a random dierence results in a collision with a probability of 2 −16 instead of 2 −32 for the rst output column. Since the rank of all four output column matrices is two, we get a collision at the output of the hash function with a probability of 2 −16×4 = 2 −64 for the given truncated dierential path.
3.3 High-Level Outline of the Attack To nd input pairs according to the truncated dierential path given in Figure 2 , we use a rebound attack [8] with multiple inbound phases [5, 7] . The main advantage of multiple inbound phases is that we can rst nd pairs for each inbound phase independently and then, connect (or merge) the results. Furthermore, we also use multiple outbound phases and separate the merging process into three dierent parts which can be solved mostly independently: ing dierences at the output of the hash function collide with a probability of 2 −64 and we get one collision among the 2 64 solutions of the previous step.
The total time complexity of the attack is 2 112 and determined by Step 5; the memory complexity is 2 85.3 and determined by Step 7.
Details of the Attack
In this section, we describe the each phase of the collision attack on 5 rounds of in detail. Note that some phases are also reused in the attacks on the compression function of Section 4.
First Inbound between S 16 and S 24 . We rst search for internal state pairs conforming to the truncated dierential path in round 3 (yellow and black bytes). We start the attack by choosing dierences for the active bytes in state S 16 such that the truncated dierential path of SuperMixColumns between state S 14 and S 16 is fullled (Section 2.1). We compute this dierence forward to state S 17 through the linear layers. We continue with randomly chosen dierences of state S 24 and compute backwards to state S 20 , the output of the SuperSBoxes. Since we have 64 active S-boxes in this state, the probability of a dierential is about 2 −1×64 . Hence, we need 2 64 starting dierences but get 2 64 solutions for the inbound phase in round 3 (see [8] ). We determine the right pairs for each of the 16 SuperSBox between state S 17 and S 20 independently. Using the Dierential Distribution Table of the SuperSBoxes, we can nd one right pair with average complexity one. In total, we compute 2 96 solutions for this inbound phase with time complexity 2 96 and memory complexity of at most 2 64 . For each of these pairs, dierences and values of all yellow and black bytes in round 3 are determined.
Second Outbound between S 24 and S 31 . In the outbound phase, we ensure the propagation in round 4 of the truncated dierential path by propagating the right pairs of the previous inbound phase forwards to state S 31 . With a probability of 2 −96 , we get four active bytes after MixColumns in state S 31 (green) conforming to the truncated path. Hence, among the 2 96 right pairs of the inbound phase between S 16 and S 24 we expect to nd one such right pair.
The total complexity to nd this partial pair between S 16 and S 31 is then 2 96 . Note that for this pair, the values and dierences of the yellow, green and black bytes between states S 16 and S 31 can be determined. Furthermore, note that for any choice of the remaining bytes, the truncated dierential path between state S 31 and state S 40 is fullled.
Second Inbound between S 7 and S 14 . Here, we search for many pairs of internal states conforming to the truncated dierential path between states S 7 and S 14 . Note that we can independently search for pairs of each BigColumn of state S 7 , since the four BigColumns stay independent until they are mixed by the following BigMixColumns transformation between states S 15 and S 16 . For each BigColumn, four SuperSBoxes are active and we need at least 2 16 starting dierentials for each one to nd the rst right pair.
The dierence in S 14 is already xed due to the yellow inbound phase but we can still choose at least 2 32 dierences for each active AES state in S 7 . Using the rebound technique, we can nd one pair on average for each starting dierence in the inbound phase. Then, we independently iterate through all 2 32 starting dierences for the rst, second and third column and through all 2 64 starting dierences for the fourth column of state S 7 . We get 2 32 right pairs for each of the rst three columns and 2 64 pairs for the fourth column. The complexity to nd all these pairs is 2 64 in time and memory.
For each resulting right pair, the values and dierences of the red and black bytes between states S 7 and S 14 can be computed. Furthermore, the truncated dierential path in backward direction, except for two cyan bytes in the rst states, is fullled. In the next phase, we partially merge the right pairs of the yellow and red inbound phase. But rst, we recall the conditions for this merge.
First Part in Merging the Inbound Phases. For each pair of the previous two phases, the values of the red, yellow and black bytes of state S 14 and S 16 are xed. These two states are separated by the linear SuperMixColumns transformation: taking the rst column-slice as an example, we get
where M SMC is the SuperMixColumns transformation matrix, A i the input bytes determined by the red inbound phase and B i the output bytes determined by the yellow inbound phase. All bytes x i and y i are free to choose. As shown by Jean and Fouque [4] , we only get a solution with probability 2 −8 for each column-slice due to the low rank of the M SMC matrix. In [4] (Appendix A), the 8-bit condition for that particular column-slice that ensures the system to have solutions has been derived and is given as follows:
(1) Similar 8-bit conditions exist for all 16 column-slices. In total, each right pair of the two (independent) inbound phases results in a 128-bit condition on the whole SuperMixColumns transformation between states S 14 and S 16 . Remember that we have constructed one pair for the yellow inbound phase and in total, 2 32 × 2 32 × 2 32 × 2 64 = 2 160 pairs for the red inbound phase. Among these 2 160 pairs, we expect to nd 2 32 right pairs which also satisfy the 128-bit condition of the SuperMixColumns between states S 14 and S 16 . In the following, we show how to nd all these 2 32 pairs with a complexity of 2 96 .
First, we combine the 2 32 × 2 32 = 2 64 pairs determined by the two rst BigColumns of state S 7 in a list L 1 and the 2 32 × 2 64 = 2 96 pairs determined by the last two BigColumns of state S 7 in a list L 2 . Note that the pairs in these two lists are independent. Then, we separate Equation (1) into terms determined by L 1 and terms determined by L 2 :
We apply the left-hand side to the elements of L 1 and the right-hand side to elements of L 2 and sort L 1 according to the bytes to be matched. [2, 1] to also match the 2-byte (cyan) and 1-bit padding at the input in AES state S 0 [2, 3] . Then, all gray, light-gray, cyan and brown bytes have already been determined either by an inbound phase, chaining value, padding or just by choosing random values for the remaining free bytes of the two rst columns of S 7 . However, all white, red, green, yellow and blue bytes are still free to choose.
By considering the linear SuperMixColumns transformation, we observe that in each column-slice, 14 out of 32 input/output bytes are already xed and 2 bytes are still free to choose. Hence, we expect to get 2 16 solutions for this linear system of equations. Unfortunately, also for the given position of already determined 14 bytes, the linear system of equations does not have a full rank. Again, we can determine the resulting system using the matrix M SMC of SuperMixColumns. As an example, for the rst column-slice, the system is given as follows:
T .
The free variables in this system are x 6 , . . . ,
have been determined by the rst or second inbound phase and the values 
The resulting linear 8-bit equation to get a solution for this system can be separated into terms depending on values of L i and on L i , and we get
where f 1 , f 2 and f 3 are linear functions. For all other 16 column-slices and xed positions of gray bytes, we get matrices of rank three as well. In total, we get 16 8-bit conditions and the probability to nd a solution for a given choice of gray and light-gray values in states S 14 and S 16 is 2 −128 . However, we can nd a solution to these linear equations using the birthday eect and a meet-in-the-middle attack with a complexity of 2 64 in time and memory.
We start by choosing 2 64 values for each of the rst (gray) and second (light-gray) BigColumns in state S 7 . We compute these values independently forward to state S 14 and store them in two lists L and L . We also separate all equations of the 128-bit condition into parts depending only on values of L and L . We apply the resulting functions f 1 , f 2 , f 3 to the elements of lists L i and L i , and merge two lists L 128 L using the birthday eect.
Third part in Merging Inbound Phases. We continue with a generalized birthday match to nd values for all remaining bytes of the state (blue, red, green, yellow, cyan and white of Figure 3 ). For each column in state S 14 , we independently choose 2 64 values for the green, blue, yellow and red columns, and compute them independently backward to S 8 . We need to match the values of the cyan bytes of state S 7 , which results in a condition on 24 bytes or 192 bits. Since we have four independent lists with 2 64 values in state S 8 , we can use the generalized birthday attack [16] to nd one solution with a complexity of 2 192/3 = 2 64 in time and memory.
In more detail, we need to match values after the BigMixColumns transformation in the backward direction. Hence, we rst multiply each byte of the four independent lists by the four multipliers of the InvMixColumns transformation. Then, we get 24 equations containing only XOR conditions on bytes between the target value and elements of the four independent lists, which can be solved using a generalized birthday attack.
To improve the average complexity of this generalized birthday attack, we can start with larger lists for the green, blue, yellow and red columns in state S 14 . Since we need to match a 192-bit condition, we can get 2 3 · x × 2 −192 = 2 x solutions with a time and memory complexity of max{2 64 , 2 x } (see [16] 
These solutions are propagated outwards in a second, independent outbound phase. Since the dierences at the output collide with a probability of 2 −64 , we expect to nd one pair which collides at the output of the hash function. The time complexity is determined by merging the chaining input and the memory requirements by the generalized birthday attack. To summarize, the complexity to nd a collision for 5 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function is given by about 2 112 compression function evaluations with memory requirements of 2 85.3 .
In this section, we detail our distinguisher on 7 rounds in the known-salt model. First, we show how to obtain partial solutions that verify the path from the state S 6 to S 23 with an average complexity of 2 64 in time, as we obtain 2 64 solutions with a cost of 2 128 . These partial solutions determine also the values of the blue bytes (in Figure 4) . Next, we show how to do the same for the yellow part of the path from S 30 to S 47 . Finally, we explain how to merge these partial solutions for nding one that veries the whole path.
Finding pairs between S 6 and S 23
We explain here how to nd 2 64 solutions for the blue part with a cost of 2 128 in time and 2 64 in memory. This is done with a stop-in-the-middle algorithm similar to the one presented in [11] for improving the time complexity of the ECHO-256 distinguisher. This algorithm has to be adapted to this particular situation, where all the active states belong to the same BigColumn.
We start by xing the dierence in S 8 to a chosen value, so that the transition between S 6 and S 8 is veried. We x the dierence in the active diagonals of the two AES-states we said, the four groups are independent in this part of the path). In the sequel, those 
A if we nd a match for the dierences. We expect to nd one in each list and this determines the values for the whole state S 15 [0, 0] (as the elements in these lists are formed by dierences and values). This means that the value of the active AES state in S 15 is also completely determined. This way, we can check in the previously generated list L 0,1 if the correct value for the two diagonals 0 and 1 appears. We expect to nd it once.
• As we have just found a valid element from L 0,1 , it determines the dierences in the AES states S 23 [1, 0] and S 23 [2, 0] that were not xed yet. Now, we need to check if, for those dierences in S 23 , the corresponding elements in the four lists , 3] that match with the dierences xed in the diagonals 2 and 3 of S 15 6 , satisfy the values in S 15 that were also determined by the lists L i A . This occurs with probability 2 −64 . All in all, the time complexity of this algorithm is 2 64 · (2 64 +2 64 ) = 2 129 with a memory requirement of 2 64 . The resulting expected number of valid pairs is 2 64 · 2 64 · 2 64 · 2 −64 · 2 −64 = 2 64 .
Finding pairs between S 30 and S 47
In quite the same way as the previous section, we can nd solutions for the yellow part with an average cost of 2 64 . To do so, we take into account the fact that the MixColumns 
Merging solutions
In this section, we explain how to get a solution for the whole path. As explained in our Section 4.1, we can nd 2 64 solutions for the blue part, that have the same dierence for the active AES states of columns 0 and 1 in S 23 . We obtain 2 64 solutions from a xed value for the dierences in S 8 and the AES states S 23 [0, 0] and S 23 [3, 1] . Repeating this process for the 2 32 possible dierences in S 8 , we obtain in total 2 96 solutions for the blue part with the same dierences in the columns 0 and 1 in S 23 . The cost of this step is 2 160 in time and 2 96 in memory.
The same way, using the algorithm explained in Section 4.2, we can also nd 2 96 solutions for the yellow part, that have the same dierence value for the AES active states of columns 0 and 1 in S 32 (we x the dierence value of this two columns in S 32 , and we try all the 2 32 possible values for the dierence in S 47 ). The cost of this step is also 2 160 in time and 2 96 in memory. Now, from the partial solutions obtained in the previous steps, we want to nd a solution that veries the whole dierential path. For this, we want to merge the solutions from S 23 with the solutions from S 32 . We know that the dierences of the columns 0,1 of S 24 and S 31 are xed. Hence, from S 24 to S 31 , there are four AES states for which we know the input dierence and the output dierence, as they are xed 7 . We can then apply a variant of the SuperSBox [3, 5] technique in these four AES states: it xes the possible values for the active diagonals of those states.
The dierences in the other four AES states in S 24 that are xed are associated to other dierences that are not xed 8 . There are 2 64 possible dierences, each one associated to 2 32 solutions for S 32 -S 47 given by the solutions that we found in the second step. For each one of these 2 64 possible dierences, one possible value is associated by the SuperSBox. When computing backwards these values to state S 24 , as we have also the values for the other four AES states of the columns 0 and 1 that are also xed (in the third step), we can compute the values for these two columns in S 23 , and we need 32 × 2 bit conditions to be veried on the values. So for each one of the 2 64 possible dierences in S 31 , we obtain 2 96−64 = 2 32 that verify the conditions on S 23 . In total, we have 2 64+32 = 2 96 possible partial matches.
For each of the 2 64 possible dierences in S 31 , its associated 2 32 possible partial matches also need to verify the 128-bit condition in S 30 -S 32 at the SuperMixColumns layer [4] and the remaining 2 × 32 bit conditions on the values of S 23 . Since for each of the 2 64 dierences we have 2 32 possible associated values in S 32 , the probability of nding a good pair is 2 96−128−64+32 = 2 −64 .
If we repeat this merging procedure 2 64 times, namely for 2 32 dierences in the columns 0 and 1 of S 23 and for 2 32 dierences in the columns 0 and 1 of S 32 , we should nd a solution. We then repeat the procedure for the cross product of the 2 32 solutions for each side. As we do not want to compute them each time that we use them, as it would increase the time complexity, we can just store the 2 64+32+32 = 2 128 solutions for the rst part and use the corresponding ones when needed, while the second part is computed in sequence. The complexity would be: 2 192 + 2 192 + 2 96+64 in time and 2 128 in memory. So far, we have found a partial solution for the dierential part for rounds from S 6 to S 48 . We still have the passive bytes to determine and the condition to pass from S 50 to S 51 to verify. This can be done exactly as in the second and third part of the merge inbound phase of Section 3.4 with no additional cost.
Moreover, since we can nd x solutions with complexity max{x, 2 96 } in time and 2 96 memory for the (independent) merge inbound phase, we can get x < 2 193 solutions with time complexity 2 193 + max{x, 2 96 } ∼ 2 193 and 2 128 memory. We need only 2 96 of these solutions to pass the probabilistic propagation in the last round from S 50 to S 51 . Hence, we can nd a complete solution for the whole path with a cost of about 2 193 in time and 2 128 in memory. Furthermore, with a probability of 2 −128 , the input and output dierences in S 0 and S 48 collide in the feed-forward and BigFinal transformation. Therefore, we can also generate free-start collisions for 6 rounds of the compression function with a time complexity of 2 193 + 2 128 ∼ 2 193 and 2 128 memory. 5 Conclusions
In this work, we have presented new results on the second-round candidate of the SHA-3 competition ECHO-256 that improve considerably the previous published cryptanalysis. Our analysis are based on multi-inbound rebound attacks and are summarized in Table 1 .
The main results are a 5-round collision of the hash function and a 7-round distinguisher of its compression function. All of our results take into account the condition observed in [4] , which is needed to merge the results of multiple inbound phases, and satisfy it. The 7-round distinguisher on the compression function uses the stop-in-the-middle algorithms proposed in [10] .
In this section, we show how to get a collision attack for 6 rounds and a subspace distinguisher for 7 rounds of the ECHO-256 compression function in the chosen-salt model. For both attacks, we get a complexity of 2 160 compression function evaluations with memory requirements of 2 128 . The attacks on the hash functions of ECHO can be extended to the compression function in a straightforward way. In this case, instead of the chaining value, a 512-bit value of another inbound phase is merged with the rst inbound phase. In fact, we can continue with a similar 3-round path in backward direction as we have in the hash function case in forward direction. Then, the full active ECHO state is located in the middle round and we can construct attacks for up to 7 rounds for the compression functions of ECHO-256 (see Figure 5 ).
A.1 The Truncated Dierential Path
We use the 7-round truncated dierential path given in Figure 5 . Black bytes are active and colored bytes show the dierent inbound and outbound phases. Since this path is sparse, we are able to nd many right pairs conforming to the path. We can already compute the expected number of right pairs by considering the MixColumns and SuperMixColumns transformations. At the input, we can freely choose the 256-byte values, the 16-byte difference between the values and the 16-byte salt. We get a reduction of pairs at the rst MC and SMC of round 1, the second MC of round 3, the rst MC and SMC of round 4, the BMC of round 5 and the second MC of round 6. The dierential probability (in base-2 logarithm) for the path is given as follows:
To summarize, the expected number of pairs conforming to this 7-round truncated dierential path is
which corresponds to 800 degrees of freedom. Note that this is much more than for the paths given in [9] and [12] . 
A.2 Outline of the Attack
The main idea of the attack is to nd solutions for the forward and backward parts independently for xed dierences at the same layer between states S 30 and S 32 . For the yellow/purple part, we can nd 2 128 pairs with a complexity of 2 128 by choosing the salt value. For the green/blue/red part, we detail how to nd 2 128 pairs as well, but with a complexity of 2 160 by constructing the salt. Then, we just need to match the 128-bit salt values of the forward and backward parts and fulll the 128-bit condition on the input (red) and output (yellow) values of SuperMixColumnsfor the merge to be possible. Since we get 2 128 independent pairs for both the forward and backward parts, we can fulll the resulting 256-bit condition by merging the two resulting lists.
A.3 Finding Right Pairs for Sparse Paths of the Permutation
In this section, we show how to nd a pair for the rst 6 rounds of the 7-round truncated dierential path of Figure 5 . We detail how to nd such a right pair in time 2 160 with 2 128 memory. We use this path in the chosen-salt model to get a collision for 6 rounds and a distinguisher for 7 rounds of the ECHO-256 compression function. To match also these 4-byte values, we only set the four diagonal bytes of the salt value. For each of the 2 32 pairs with matching dierences, we compute the diagonal bytes of the salt such that the values also match. We sort the resulting list according to the 4-byte salt value and repeat the same for all four BigColumns of state S 23 . Then, we just need to iterate through all four lists and search for matching salt values. Note that for some salt values, we will get no solution, but for some we will get more than one solution. On average, we expect to get 2 32 matching pairs with a complexity of 2 32 with chosen diagonal bytes of the salt.
Inbound between S 6 and S 15 . To nd a pair of states conforming to the green part, we rst choose a dierence verifying the truncated dierential path between state S 6 and state S 8 . The second starting point for the green inbound phase is the dierence in state S 15 , which has been chosen in the blue inbound phase. Again, we get one pair on average for each starting dierential. This pair needs to be connected with the solutions of the blue inbound phase. To do so, we rst match the values in the diagonal bytes of state S 15 . Remember that in the previous phases, we have constructed 2 32 pairs for a single dierence in state S 15 . Among these pairs, we expect to nd one such that the diagonal 4-byte values between the green and blue inbound phase match. To connect the other 12 bytes, we can simply set the remaining 12 bytes of the salt value. Hence, we get one solution for the combined green, blue and red part with an average complexity of 2 32 .
First Part in Merging Inbound Phases. To merge the inbound phases, we rst compute 2 128 pairs for the yellow/purple part with a time and memory complexity of 2 128 and store these pairs in a list L 2 . Similarly, we compute 2 128 pairs for the green/blue/red part. Since the complexity to compute one solution for this part is 2 32 , the time complexity to compute all 2 128 pairs is 2 160 . To connect the resulting pairs between states S 30 and S 32 , we need to satisfy two 128-bit conditions. First, we need to verify the linear 128-bit SuperMixColumns condition observed by Jean and Fouque in [4] . Second, since each solution of the yellow/purple and green/blue/red part has also a dierent salt value, we need to match the 128-bit salt as well. In the end, this leads to a 256-bit condition, which we can be satised by merging the two lists L 1 and L 2 under that condition to produce 2 128 × 2 128 × 2 −256 = 1 right pair, which satises the whole 6-round truncated dierential path. The time complexity of this step is 2 160 with memory requirements of 2 128 .
Second Part in Merging Inbound Phases. In the second part of the merge inbound phase, we need to nd values for the two rst columns of Figure 3 . This part of the attack is the same as in the hash function attack on ECHO-256 (see Section 3.4).
Third Part in Merging Inbound Phases. The only dierence in the third part of the merge inbound phase is that we change the time-memory trade-o slightly to get an average complexity of 1 for each solution. Again, we do a generalized birthday attack but this time, we start with 2 96 independent values for each column of state S 30 (Figure 3) . Since we have a 192-bit condition in state S 23 , we get 2 3×96 × 2 −192 = 2 96 solutions with a complexity of 2 96 in time and memory, or with an average complexity of 1 per solution [16] . It follows that we can nd up to 2 160 right pairs for the 6-round truncated dierential path with a total complexity of 2 160 and memory requirements of 2 128 .
A.4 Chosen-Salt Collision Attack for 6 Rounds
To get a collision for 6 rounds of the 512-bit compression function of in the chosen-salt, we need to ensure that the dierences in the feed-forward cancel the output dierences of the permutation: this happens with a probability of 2 −128 . Since we can nd 2 160 pairs for the truncated dierential path with a complexity of 2 160 , we expect to nd 2 32 collisions at the output of the 6-round compression function with a time complexity of 2 160 and memory requirements of 2 128 .
A.5 Chosen-Salt Distinguisher for 7 Rounds
To get a chosen-salt distinguisher for 7 rounds of the compression function of ECHO-256, we use the whole truncated dierential path given in Figure 5 . Note that the last round of this truncated dierential path is veried with a probability of 2 −96 . Furthermore, with an additional 32-bit condition on the active bytes in state S 52 , we can x the dierence at the output of the permutation, prior to the feed-forward. In this case, only the 16-byte dierences in the diagonal bytes of the output of the compression function change for each additional found pair. In other words, the dierence vector space at the output of the compression function reduces to a dimension of 128. We use a third outbound phase to satisfy these conditions in the last round. Since we can nd one solution for the white bytes of the 6-round path with an average complexity one, we can nd one pair which also satises the conditions in the last round with a time and memory complexity 2 128 . Note that we can nd up to 2 32 such pairs with a total complexity of 2 160 in time and 2 128 memory.
Again, we use [5, Equation 19 ] to compute the complexity of a generic distinguishing attack on the ECHO-256 compression function. We get the parameters N = 512 (compression function output size), n = 128 (dimension of output dierence vector space) and t = 2 32 (number of outputs in vector space) for the subspace distinguisher. Then, the generic complexity to construct 2 32 elements in a vector space of dimension 128 is about 2 207.8 compression function evaluations. All in all, we get a chosen-salt distinguisher for 7 rounds of the ECHO-256 compression function with a complexity of 2 160 in time and 2 128 memory.
Note that we can use almost the same attack to construct 2 32 near-collisions with a zero dierence in the same 320 bits. Again, we need to satisfy the 96-bit condition in the cyan bytes in the last round. However, we now require that the overlapping 4-byte dierences in the feed-forward cancel each other. This 32-bit condition ensures that we get only 4 × 6 = 24 active bytes at the output of the compression function for 2 32 pairs with a total complexity of 2 160 in time and 2 128 memory in the chosen-salt model. In this section, we describe a way to extend the compression function collision attack presented in [4] into a collision attack on the 4-round hash function ECHO-256 with a time and memory complexity of 2 64 . That published attack nds a message pair (M 1 , M 1 ) and a chaining value h such that f (h, M 1 ) = f (h, M 1 ), where f is the ECHO-256 compression function. To get a collision in the hash function, the dierence then consists in nding a message block M 0 which veries f (IV, M 0 ) = h. This way, the collision in the hash function is the result of an internal collision in the compression function: consequently, we do not need to take care of the padding in that scenario. For any message M , we would have: ECHO 4R (IV, M 0 ||M 1 ||M ) = ECHO 4R (IV, M 0 ||M 1 ||M ), where || denotes the concatenation of messages and ECHO 4R the 4-round ECHO-256 hash function.
Description of the attack. As in the other attacks suggested in this paper, we use the rebound technique with multiple inbound phases to nd a valid message pair. The path The truncated dierential path used in the 4-round collision attack on the hash function.
used here is depicted in Figure 6 . The rst inbound is located in the second round between states S 7 and S 14 and can be done in parallel on the four BigColumns and the second one is in the third round between states S 16 and S 24 . We extend the latter by a probabilistic outbound phase to lter out some of its valid pairs in order to reduce the number of active bytes in the nal fourth round. In the sequel, we consider the alternative description of the permutation (see 2.1).
At rst, we precompute and store the Dierential Distribution Table ∆ of the SuperSBox in time and memory 2 64 . Then, we randomize the dierences around the merging point: the SuperMixColumns at the end of the second round. Using ∆, we nd a pair of internal states conforming to the second inbound and the outbound phase. This can be done in the same way as in [4] At this point, each of the 2 32 entries of L consists of a chaining value h = f (IV, M 0 ), a pair of BigColumns for the two rst BigColumns and a set E of 2 32 valid pairs for the third BigColumn, all conforming to the rst inbound. As demonstrated in [4] , the 128-bit condition to merge the two inbound phases is deported to the fourth BigColumn in the rst inbound. More precisely, once we know a pair for each of the three rst BigColumns, we can deduce the fourth one so that the merge around the SuperMixColumns layer is possible. For each entry in L and for each associated set E, we are in that case so that we can deduce the pair for the fourth BigColumn. Finally, we check if the truncated path is veried for that BigColumn and if the value in diag(S 7 [3, 1] ) matches the expected one. The two events occur with probability 2 −64 but since we can repeat the check 2 32 × 2 32 = 2 64 times, we should nd one M 0 and one pair for each of the four BigColumns.
Finally, we can nish the attack as in [4] by ensuring that the dierences cancel out in the feed-forward and by merging the two partial solutions. We note that the merging is slightly dierent since we need to take care of the known AES states in S 7 but is still feasible in time 2 64 .
